

# 1 - 33 Rossett House, Hull

## Type 4 Fire Risk Assessment



Prepared for:	Rebecca Franks, Programme Manager
Prepared by:	John Askew, Fire Risk Assessor, Holistic Fire Safety
Date:	03/04/2024
Document Reference:	HFS.HCC.RossettHouse.FRA.1.0



Fire Stopping  
Installation



Fire Door  
Installation



Fire Door Installation  
Fire Door Maintenance



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Significant findings identified in HFS.HCC.RossettHouse.FRA.1.0 & HFS.HCC.RossettHouse.AP.1.0: 17 actions
- Proposed next review date: 21/09/2024
- Assessment review type: T3
- Requirement for additional inspections prior to assessment review: It is advised that work streams are monitored by a competent person to ensure satisfactory performance/installation/levels of remediation.

### OVERALL BUILDING RISK RATING

Taking into account the fire prevention measures observed at the time of this assessment, it is considered that the hazard from fire (probability of ignition) at this building is:

LOW		MEDIUM	X	HIGH	
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Taking into account the nature of the building and the occupants, as well as the fire protection and procedural arrangements observed at the time of this assessment, it is considered that the consequences for life safety in the event of fire would be:

SLIGHT HARM		MODERATE HARM	X	EXTREME HARM	
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The overall risk rating for the building is considered to be:

**MODERATE RISK**

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# Fire Risk Assessment - Version 3

21 Sep 2023 / John Askew / Rossett House

**Complete**

**Site conducted**

Rossett House, Hull City Council  
T4 FRA programme

**Conducted on**

21/09/2023 09:30 BST

**Prepared by**

John Askew

**Location**

1 - 33 Rossett House  
Hull  
England  
HU3 2RD  
United Kingdom



Photo 1

## Inspection

### Responsible person (e.g. employer) or person having control of the premises:

Hull City Council

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### Address of premises:

1 - 33 Rossett House  
Hull  
England  
HU3 2RD

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### Person consulted:

Mike White

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### Assessor:

John Askew

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### Report validated by:

William Davidson

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### Date of fire risk assessment:

21/09/2023

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### Date of previous fire risk assessment:

HCC To Confirm

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### Suggested date for review:

21/09/2024

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## 1. General information

### 1.1. Dimensions/footprint:

550m<sup>2</sup> per floor / Total 3300m<sup>2</sup>

### 1.2. In accordance with Regulation 3 Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022, is the premises defined as a 'High-rise Residential' Building?

In accordance with Regulation 3 Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022, 1 - 33 Rossett House is not defined as a 'High-rise Residential Building'.

### 1.3. Number of floors at ground level and above:

Ground floor and x 5 upper floor levels.

### 1.4. Number of floors entirely below ground level:

None.

### 1.5. Floors on which car parking is provided:

None.

### 1.6 Age:

The building is believed to be constructed in 1969.

### 1.7. Number of flats:

There are x33 residential dwellings in total, with x16 residential dwellings on the third floor, x2 residential dwellings on floors 2, 3, 4 & 5 and x9 on the ground floor.

1 - 33 Rossett House is a general needs premises.

### 1.8. General description external:

Comprehensive refurbishment was completed on Rossett House in 1986 - 1987 which included the installation of an external wall system.

Following surveys completed by Fire Guidance UK LLP, findings from the report confirmed that the building facade had been over clad with an external wall system. The external wall system build-up is described below:

- 50mm polystyrene insulation, mechanically fixed to the structural façade
- Wetherby (Epsicon 1) render system comprising:

- o 18mm cementitious render
- o Stainless steel support mesh
- o Plastic spreading clips

The polystyrene insulation board is neither non-combustible or of limited combustibility. As the polystyrene insulation board does not meet the minimum requirements of Approved Document B to be classed as of 'limited-combustibility', where a building has an uppermost storey exceeding 18m above external ground level unless the wall construction is that of a traditional, double masonry leaf build-up, it would not be suitable. However, none of the walls at Rossett House exceed 18m in height above external ground level therefore technically, the polystyrene insulation board system installed would meet the functional requirements of the Building Regulations in terms of combustibility.

To conclude, 1 - 33 Rossett House is not over-clad with an ACM system and technically meets the functional

requirements of the Building Regulations. This is further discussed in Section 16.



Photo 2

[17020-CTN-R026-RC-20170821.pdf](#)

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### 1.9. General description of basement:

N/A.

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### 1.10. General description ground floor:

The ground floor is made up of nine residential flats, a store/cleaners room, CCTV/Services room and a passenger lift.

Seven of the ground floor flats are accessed externally. The escape stairs provide access to open air via the main access/egress door and a single final exit door to the north of the building, and by a single final exit door to the south of the building. All doors open in the direction of travel.

Accessed externally on the ground floor is the refuse collection point (bin store) and the gas boiler room.

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
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### 1.11. General description of flats:

Residential flats are single, two and three bed occupancies whereby all habitable rooms discharge onto the internal hallway. Means of escape within ground floor flats and flats which discharge directly into the single staircase to the north of the building are typical of diagram 3.3 of ADB B1 which does not require flats to have a protected internal hallway. This principle was based on limiting travel distances to circa 9m which in turn reduces the chance that residents could become trapped in the event of a fire. Additionally, cooking facilities are remote from the entrance door and do not prejudice the escape route from any point in the flat.

Flats accessed from the third floor corridor can be described as duplex/maisonettes and alternate between flats that descend one storey down within the flat or ascend two storeys up. Travel distances are in excess of 9m and thereby rely on a protected internal hallway.

Travel distances within flats is covered in Section 18.2.



ADB B1 Diagram 3.3

Photo 3

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### 1.12. General description of means of escape:

Means of escape are of simple design and construction whereby flats to the 6 storey stairway to the north of the building are separated from the stairway by self closing, certified FD30s flat entrance doorsets which discharge directly onto the stairway.

Once access is made into this common escape stair, ultimate safety is achieved via a self closing, notional FD30 doorset into to the entrance lobby area then via the main access/egress door and a single final exit door, both of which open in the direction of travel.

Alternative means of escape are available from the third floor corridor and achieved by the main common escape stairway which is separated from the lift lobby by a self closing, notional FD30s doorset and by a

single staircase to the south of the building, which is separated from the corridor by a self closing, notional FD30s doorset.

The third floor corridor is separated along the means of escape by self closing, notional FD30s doorsets.

### 1.13. General description of service risers:

There are x7 electric meter cupboards located externally on the ground floor. Services appear to rise vertically to supply flats above.

### 1.14. General description of ventilation risers:

There are no risers as such, however the block is provided with what is believed to be shunt ducts to provide extract from bathrooms (this does not apply to kitchens). It is suspected that ducts travel the full height of the building, serving a large number of flats vertically before terminating at roof level.

It has been traditional for many years for the common extract from bathrooms to incorporate shunt ducts, which reduce the likelihood of fire and smoke-spread between flats.

Fire dampers are provided in ductwork at the point extraction exits bathrooms in residential dwellings and enters central shafts. Bathrooms sampled (Flat 30) gave evidence of x1 vents (high level) which have dampers installed which are activated via a fusible link.

Although dampers do not restrict the spread of smoke in the early stages of a fire, it would prevent spread of flames and hot gases.




Photo 4




Photo 5




Photo 6

### 1.15. General description of chute system:

There is a single refuse chute provided at Rossett House with disposal points located on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th floors, separated from the common escape stair or lobbies by self-closing, notional FD30s fire doorsets.

The refuse chute has recently undergone refurbishment and now provides adequate protection at floor levels with a self-closing, intumescent lined hopper disposal points and an automatic isolation shutter which is activated by means of a fusible link at the base of the chute. The base of the chute is accessed externally.




Photo 7



Photo 8



Photo 9



Photo 10



Photo 11




Photo 12

## 2. Floor plans and building plan

In relation to Regulation 6 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022, the responsible person in relation to a high-rise residential building must prepare a plan for each floor of the high-rise residential building. The floor plans must, together, identify the location of all lifts and identify if the lift is one for use by firefighters or an evacuation lift, and the key fire-fighting equipment in the whole building. Plans must include the following:

- Surrounding area of building detailing points of access, emergency response routes/appliance positioning
- Building dimensions
- Confirmation of number of storeys – basement/parking, ancillary, residential floors, roof
- Location of different accommodation types in building – single bed/two bed/maisonette
- Inlets for dry riser/wet riser
- Isolation valves for active systems
- Firefighting access points – firefighting shaft
- Location of secure information box
- Location of smoke control systems
- Key points of building – stairway, risers, lobbies (smoke containment locations)
- Evacuation alert system location

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### 2.1. Has the responsible person prepared a plan for each floor of the high-rise residential building and do plans meet the requirements of Regulation 6 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022?

Holistic Fire Safety have prepared a plan for each floor at Rossett House. Floor plans identify points of access, means of escape, as well as assisting to identify the location of all lifts and key fire-fighting equipment.

[22291-ROSS-01A-22291-ROSS-00.pdf](#)

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### 3. Construction

#### 3.1. Describe the standard and methods of construction which make up the premises:

Rossett House is constructed of reinforced concrete floor slabs to each level with concrete load-bearing columns, the stairs and external facade is constructed of block and brickwork. The internal flat walls are of brick and block construction with a plaster finish.

Due to its construction being circa 1960's, it is likely that Rossett House was constructed to British Standard Code of Practice `CP3 Chapter IV, Precautions against fire – Fire precautions in flats of 80 feet or above`.

Bryant Bison 340: The industrialised building system consisted of load-bearing precast concrete wall and floor units, jointed on site with in-situ concrete and dry packed mortar after erection. In tower blocks over 12 storeys in height, all of the walls were load-bearing - external and internal.

Wimpey-No Fines: Constructed from cast in-situ concrete, No-Fines was one of the most successful system built houses. The wall construction contains no sand fraction using 1/2" to 3/4" stone aggregate mixed with cement. This creates a honeycomb type structure within the concrete. The construction of the system is similar to that of traditional solid walled masonry properties and offers a high level of robustness.

New Michael Street focuses upon the principle of compartmentation of both the staircore, ancillary accommodation and flats.

Due to reduced travel distances within flats, they are not required to have an internal 'protected' hallway to create a place of relative safety before the flat can be evacuated.

Subsequently, this supports a 'stay put' strategy based on the level of compartmentation together with additional features, including the external fabric. As a result, it was predicted that the block would withhold and minimise any fire situation to a relatively small area.

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## 4. Occupancy

### 4.1. In relation to Approved Document B Volume 1. 2019, the purpose group is:

1(a) Flats

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### 4.2. In relation to BS 9991:2015 (BS 9999:2017) Fire safety in the design, management and use of (residential) buildings, the risk profile is:

The risk profile for General Needs occupants is considered to be: 'Ci' (long term managed occupancy of mainstream housing of general needs with no special features with 'low/medium' fire growth of 0.012 kJ/s<sup>3</sup> by evenly distributed low to mid-level fire loading compromising a mix of combustible materials).

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### 4.3. Estimated total occupancy on a normal day to day basis:

Circa 66

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### 4.4. Max number of employees:

<5.

There are no permanent staff working within the building, however the block is provided with a caretaker. HCC operate a caretaker scheme whereby a representative of HCC ensures the day to day running of the block by carrying out tasks such as reporting antisocial behaviour, maintaining housekeeping and liaising with residents to resolve issues.

In addition, housing officers regularly attend site for specific duties such as routine testing and maintenance. Lone working is avoided where possible, however due to the nature of some activities, lone working is inevitable for low risk tasks; therefore staff operate and adhere to the corporate lone working policy.

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### 4.5. Max number of residents and visitors at any one time:

Circa 70

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### 4.6. Vulnerable groups - contractors, lone workers, care workers:

It was confirmed by HCC representatives that some residents occupying the block are defined as vulnerable and that antisocial behaviour occurs occasionally. It was also confirmed that substance misuse is a common occurrence which increases the likelihood of fire should residents be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

It is possible residents will receive treatment from care and social workers on a periodic basis. All care provided is independent to HCC. Numbers should not exceed 5 at any one time, however it is likely that people providing care are unfamiliar with the premises.

HCC members of staff enter the premises on a regular basis to carry out routine testing and maintenance. Lone working is avoided where possible, however due to the nature of some activities, lone working is inevitable; therefore staff operate and adhere to the corporate lone working policy.

All contractors adhere to a strict 'control of contractors' policy which includes a selection process, the receipt of RAMS & Insurance, site induction and a permit system where necessary. It is advised that an induction is carried out by all contractors used by HCC. A generic safety pack should be provided to contractors which ensures they are familiar with emergency procedures and actions to be taken in the event of fire. Contractors should read and sign the document; this will ensure HCC are controlling contractors appropriately and meeting the requirements of Article 5(4a).

Fire action notices are displayed prominently to instruct those who are unfamiliar with the building of actions to be taken in the event of an incident.

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## 5. Evacuation strategy

### 5.1. The evacuation strategy for the building is:

As detailed within the 'Fire safety in Flats' booklet provided by HCC to residents; flats are designed to delay the spread of fire, therefore occupants should be 'relatively' safe to remain within their flats. HCC currently advise residents to:

- Evacuate the building in the event of a fire in a resident's flat
- Evacuate the building if a resident is aware of a fire in a nearby flat

The simultaneous evacuation of multiple flats/floors could potentially hinder the responding Fire & Rescue Service operational crews as evacuating residents could compromise the means of escape delaying firefighting operations; it is therefore essential that levels of compartmentation meet the necessary requirements to support a 'stay safe, stay put' strategy.

### 5.2. Have Person Centred Fire Risk Assessments (PCFRA's) been completed on all vulnerable residents?

Sue Houlton & the Housing team have recently completed a significant exercise to establish those residing within the building who required assistance with evacuation. Where necessary, person centred fire risk assessments (PCFRA) and personal emergency evacuation plans are to be created.

None confirmed at Rossett House.

### 5.3. Are Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPS's) in place for vulnerable residents?

There are currently no known PEEPS in place at Rossett House; however, should any resident's complete an 'Emergency Evacuation Support Request Form', this will trigger a PCFRA and subsequent PEEP.

### 5.4. Are PEEP's readily available to responding Emergency Services in the Secure Information Box?

Discussions are to be held with Humberside Fire & Rescue Service (HFRS) to confirm how they prefer to receive information. Although traditionally PEEPS are stored on site within the Secure Information Box, it has been highlighted that HFRS may in fact prefer to receive information electronically so that it can be accessed via the appliance mobile data terminal.

### 5.5. Is the building provided with an 'Assembly Point' / 'Muster Point'. Where applicable, is its location suitable in design and location?

The fire assembly point is located at the entrance to the car park.




Photo 13

The assembly point should be located far enough away from the building to afford protection from heat and smoke in a fire situation but not so far away as to discourage people from using it. Fire assembly points should be in positions that do not put staff, visitors and users of the building at risk from emergency vehicles responding to the incident, or from general/other traffic in the vicinity. Therefore, the assembly point should be located away from and off the vehicle access routes leading to the building. Ideally the assembly points should be located so as not to require the crossing of a road or movement through trafficked areas. The assembly points should be a temporary gathering area where it can be immediately determined if everyone is out of the building. Appropriate decisions should be made with regard to continuance of use for longer

durations. This is particularly useful in the event of a 'partial' or 'full evacuation' of the residential areas by the Fire Service using the evacuation and alert system

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## 6. Fire loss experience

### 6.1. Has there been any incidents involving fire which has resulted in loss/ damage/affected resident safety?

Following discussions with HCC representatives, there have been no incidents in the last 12 months.

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## 7. Relevant fire safety legislation

Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005  
The Fire Safety Act 2021  
The Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022  
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (Sections 2,3 & 4)  
Housing Act 2004 & Housing and Planning Act 2016

References and supporting guidance is detailed at the end of the report.

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### 7.1. The above legislation is enforced by:

The Local Authority Fire & Rescue Service - HFRS.

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### 7.2. Are there any notices in force applicable to the building - Alterations / Enforcement / Prohibition?

None.

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## 8. Electrical sources of ignition

### Communal Areas

#### 8.1. Are fixed installations periodically inspected and tested?

Electrical testing and maintenance of the hardwiring of the building has been completed by Kingstown Works Limited (KWL), it was confirmed that all EICR reports for the building are held electronically by nominated HCC representatives.

It was also confirmed that there is an EICR programme in place and a legal action procedure implemented for any customers who are not providing access. Samples taken within communal areas (expiry 05/2024) gave satisfactory test frequencies.

#### 8.2. Are Electrical Installation Condition Report (EICR) labels displayed to indicate the date of the most recent periodic inspection and the date of the next 5-year periodic inspection?

Yes.

#### 8.3. Have all 'C' deficiencies been completed within allocated timeframes?

It was confirmed that all 'C' deficiencies are allocated to KWL for completion.

#### 8.4. Is portable appliance testing carried out:

HCC provide residential flats unfurnished, therefore no electrical appliances are included within the tenancy agreement. There is no control over the use of residents' own electrical equipment within the flats themselves, however, residents are provided with a tenants' handbook which covers electrical safety.

Electrical appliances in the CCTV office and boiler room were not displaying PAT labels.




Photo 14




Photo 15




Photo 16

Whilst portable appliance testing (PAT) is not a legislative requirement, it is a requirement of Health and Safety at Work legislation under the Electrical at Works Regulations 1989, to periodically check electrical equipment for safe use. Any item which is connected to the main supply falls under Regulation 3 & 5 which places a legal responsibility on the owner, as the duty holder, to ensure that all supplied electrical equipment used within the property is safe and not in a position where they may cause danger to staff or residents.

#### 8.5. Is there a suitable limitation of trailing leads & adapters; and without evidence of overloading?



There was evidence of extension leads in use within the CCTV/Service room and gas boiler room first floor level. Care must be taken not to overload the maximum permitted rating of extension leads. Consideration should be given to removing extension leads and provide additional sockets to supply the equipment in use.




Photo 17



Photo 18



Photo 19

### 8.6. Are electrical service cables adequately supported?

Services run extensively within communal areas, however all cabling is encased within conduit and secured by metal connections preventing them from drooping or falling in the event of fire.



Photo 20

All cabling and conduit should be either encased and/or supported by metal connections preventing them to droop or fall. (BS 7671:2018 18th Edition IET regulations), Chapter 52 reg 521-10-202 18th edition).

### 8.7. Are photovoltaic panels (PV) installed?

None.

Is suitable maintenance carried out on PV system in line with manufacturers instructions. Is the location of inverters indicated on plans and are there adequate provisions in place to mitigate the risk of ignition. Is information on PV systems held within the Secure Information Box and accessible to the Fire Service in the event of an incident.

### 8.8. General comments/defects:

Electric plug sockets are located in communal areas. Landlord sockets should be fitted to prevent residents plugging electrical items into sockets.



Photo 21



Photo 22



Photo 23

Flats

### 8.9. Are distribution boards non-combustible to BS EN 61439-3 as per BS 7671:2018 (18th Edition IET Regulations) Chapter 42 Regulation 421.1.201(i)?

Yes.

### 8.10. Are fixed installations periodically inspected and tested?

Samples taken within Flat 30 (expiry 09/28) gave satisfactory test frequencies.

Inline with BS 7671:2018 IET Wiring Regulations (18th Edition) rented accommodation (flats) with short term



leases are periodically inspected every 5 years and upon change of occupancy.

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**8.11. Are Electrical Installation Condition Report (EICR) labels displayed to indicate the date of the most recent periodic inspection and the date of the next 5-year periodic inspection?**

Yes.



Photo 24

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**8.12. General comments/defects:**

All satisfactory.

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## 9. Smoking

### 9.1. Are there suitable arrangements for those who wish to smoke?

Given the general needs occupancy, there is little HCC can do on a daily basis to control/prevent smoking within residents' dwellings other than raising awareness and highlighting consequences of inappropriate discarding of materials.

There are no smoking receptacles provided externally to the premises, therefore there are no provisions for disposal.

### 9.2. Are "No smoking" signs provided within the common areas?

The building complies with current no-smoking legislation with signage displayed prominently throughout the building at all levels. Signage displayed is clearly visible and complies with the Smoke Free (signs) Regulations 2012.



Photo 25

### 9.3. Are reasonable measures taken to prevent fires as a result of smoking?

Residents are permitted to smoke within residential flats, however information relating to smoking is contained within tenants' handbooks.

### 9.4. General comments/defects:

During the assessment, a comprehensive inspection was carried out in all areas; all internal areas were sterile however, there was limited evidence of discarded cigarettes externally.

## 10. Arson, security & housekeeping

### 10.1. Does basic security against arson by outsiders appear reasonable?

The premises has the following arrangements in place:

- Access doors are provided with resident access controls
- External floodlighting is provided by streetlights
- The caretaker is a visual presence and carries out daily inspections on the premises - where necessary significant findings are reported to senior management
- There is a steel fence which runs along a large percentage of the perimeter of the block; provisions are considered to be an additional physical barrier that makes trespassers think twice about gaining entry - its intention is not to guarantee security
- There is a car park barrier that is controlled entry
- Hull City Council employees require key fobs for access and all contractors require permission before access is authorised
- CCTV is installed internally and external to the building



Photo 26




Photo 27



Photo 28

### 10.2. Is there history of / signs of anti social behaviour?

Physical evidence of antisocial behaviour within the block were limited to minor graffiti and the overall condition of internal fixtures and fittings was to a good standard.

Historically blocks of flats are often subject to damage and arson due to the volume of people (general needs) within the building, therefore arson/antisocial behaviour will always be a credible threat.

Following liaison with HCC representatives and knowledge of the local area, many of the high rise blocks within the city have been subjected to antisocial behaviour, however there doesn't appear to be any concerns at Rossett House.

### 10.3. Is there an absence of unnecessary fire load in close proximity to the premises or available for ignition by outsiders?

The immediate area around the building was sterile; waste bins were contained within the refuse chute area which is enclosed in a roller shutter and walkways around the block were sterile. Additional waste bins were visible, however they were located clear of the main building and chained to an immovable structure.



Photo 29

### 10.4. Are escape routes sterile and free from excessive fire loading?

The block operates a specific zero tolerance approach to housekeeping which is backed up by comprehensive signage, although it was noted residents' balconies and the ground floor area contained combustible items.

The area should be monitored to ensure the standard of housekeeping both internally and externally is maintained.




Photo 30



Photo 31

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**10.5. Is the standard of housekeeping within ancillary accommodation acceptable?**

All satisfactory.

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**10.6. Describe arrangements for the handling and storage of waste:**

It is understood that the main bins are emptied through a local authority contract on a regular and continual basis. Any additional build up of waste is removed on an ad-hoc contractual basis via HCC waste management. All large waste items collected by the caretaker are stored in the waste compound and where possible out of sight from passersby.

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**10.7. General comments / defects:**

All satisfactory.

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## 11. Heating system

### 11.1. Description of heating for communal areas:

There are no heaters within communal areas/means of escape.

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### 11.2. Description of heating for flats:

Heating within flats is provided by centrally heated radiators.



Photo 32

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## 12. Cooking arrangements

### 12.1. Description of kitchen layout and arrangements:

There are no cooking facilities within common areas or in ground floor areas where Hull City Council employees operate.

As stated previously, residential flats are provided unfurnished. As a result, HCC are not liable for routine test, inspection and maintenance of appliances. Fire safety information relating to kitchen safety and electrical safety is included within tenants' handbooks.

Kitchens are provided with notional FD20 doorsets and cooking facilities are remote from the entrance door and do not prejudice the escape route from any point in the flat other than the lounge.

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### 12.2. Are reasonable measures taken to prevent fires as a result of cooking?

It is considered that HCC are doing all that is reasonable to prevent incidents involving fire from occurring within flats.

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## 13. Lightning

### 13.1. Does the building have a lightning protection system?

Rossett House is one of a number of tall structures in the immediate vicinity and with the projected climate change and increased likelihood of more frequent thunderstorms, the protection of the building as a business and community asset is essential.

Risk against lightning strikes should also include the potential for loss of life and cognisance should also be given regarding the property as sleeping accommodation for circa 66+ individual residents.

Rossett House does not have a lightning protection system (LPS) in place.

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### 13.2. Has a suitable and sufficient risk assessment (RA) in accordance with BS EN 62305-2:2012 been carried out?

HCC should confirm whether an appropriate assessment of lightning protection has been completed.

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The RA would determine if protection is required, the RA should be accurate and site specific. The RA would be measured against:

Sources of Damage:

Lightning current is the primary source of damage, the following sources are distinguished by the strike attachment point:

- S1: Flashes to a Structure
- S2: Flashes near a structure
- S3: Flashes to a line
- S4: Flashes 'near' to a line

Types of Damage

Types of damage which may occur as a result of lightning strikes:

- D1: Injury to living beings, due to touch and step voltage - electric shock
- D2: Physical damage (fire, explosion, mechanical destruction, release of chemicals) due to lightning effects including sparking
- D3: Failure of electrical and electronic systems due to LEMP

BSEN 6235-2:2012

- R<sub>1</sub> Risk of loss of human life
- R<sub>2</sub> Risk of service to the public
- R<sub>3</sub> Risk of loss to cultural heritage
- R<sub>4</sub> Risk of loss of economic value

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### 13.3. General comments / defects:

None.

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## 14. Hazards introduced by outside contractors and building works

### 14.1. Is there satisfactory control over works carried out in the building by contractors?

HCC has its own maintenance personnel which are generally used for basic and low risk maintenance activities, however where required (specialist projects), HCC use approved contractors which have completed a comprehensive due diligence process - KWL.

KWL generally act as the principle contractor for works such as fire door replacement programmes and passive fire stopping works.

As the building requires maintenance during the lifecycle of use, it is likely to be subject to external maintenance by contractors requiring the use of hot works. Such activities should be subject to specific control measures such as a 'Permit to Work' (PTW) system. The PTW system allows effective control and supervision of externally introduced ignition sources.

PTW's should be the responsibility of an appointed person from HCC and accountable to the works, content of the PTW should include:

- Scope of hot works
  - Time and duration of works
  - Area of works
  - Competence of contractors
  - Correct and maintained equipment
  - Pre and post fire sweeps
-



## 15. Hazardous substances

### 15.1. Are the general fire precautions adequate to address the hazards associated with dangerous substances used or stored within the premises?

Following this assessment, there were no process risks or situations identified which required any assessment under the dangerous substances and explosive atmospheres regulations (DSEAR) 2002.

Residents are prohibited to use portable paraffin or gas cylinder heaters.

Information relating to dangerous substances and materials should be included within the tenants' handbooks.

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### 15.2. Other significant fire hazards that warrant consideration?

It has been confirmed that some residents engage in substance misuse; such activities significantly increase the risk of fire within the property as not only does it introduce ignition sources but there is also the potential for residents to be under the influence which will affect response and acknowledgement of an incident.

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## 16. Cladding & wall coverings (spread of flames and fire)

### Design and materials of external walls

Regulation 5 Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022: The responsible person in relation to a high-rise residential building must prepare a record of the design of the external walls of the building, including details of the materials from which they are constructed.

The record prepared must include details of the level of risk identified in the risk assessment required under article 9 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 that the design and materials of the external walls give rise to and any mitigating steps that have been taken in respect of that risk.

The responsible person must prepare a revised record if there are any significant changes to the external walls of the building.

#### **16.1. Do the external walls of the building adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and location of the building?**

As detailed previously, comprehensive refurbishment was completed on Rossett House in 1986 - 1987 which included the installation of an external wall overclad system.

On 21/08/2017 an initial External Facade and Cladding report was completed by Fire Guidance UK LLP - See attached.

Findings from the report confirmed that the building had been over clad. The external wall cladding build-up is described below:

- 50mm polystyrene insulation, mechanically fixed to the structural façade
- Wetherby (Epsicon 1) render system comprising:

- o 18mm cementitious render
- o Stainless steel support mesh
- o Plastic spreading clips

Rossett House is not over-clad with an ACM system, however it does contain polystyrene insulation board which does not meet the minimum requirements of Approved Document B to be classed as a material of 'limited-combustibility' as it is neither non-combustible or of limited combustibility.

As the building height does not exceed 18m which would be a trigger for removal/remedial works, the insulation system on Rossett House technically meets the functional requirements of the Building Regulations in terms of combustibility due to this.

However, it is our professional opinion that the installation of an AWFSS would mitigate the presence of insulation and other defects identified within the building .

To further support decision making, please refer to 16.4.

[17020-CTN-R026-RC-20170821.pdf](#)

#### **16.2. Is there a requirement for an External Wall Fire Risk Assessment to be carried out in line with PAS 9980?**

As previously stated, Fire Guidance UK LLP completed an External Facade and Cladding report on 21st August 2017.

It is therefore, the opinion of Holistic Fire Safety that there is no requirement for an External Wall Fire Risk

Assessment to be carried out in line with PAS 9980.



Photo 33

### 16.3. Are records of the design of the external walls and details of the materials from which they are constructed readily available?

Although basic documentation is held, it is the opinion of Holistic Fire Safety that records held by HCC are adequate to detail the make up of external walls.

HCC publish all reports and findings making them accessible to all via the World Wide Web.

Evidence of this was a Briefing Paper produced by HCC to the People and Communities which covered 'Fire Safety in High-Rise' dated 16 November 2017.

### 16.4. General comments / defects:

Further evidence from the Fire Guidance UK LLP External Facade and Cladding report reveals concerns, as follows.

Of concern at the inspection site was evidence that the internal plasterboard layer had been breached in places which may, if inadequately sealed, provide a path for fire spread from within the flat.

As evidence of this has been found in a small, single inspection area it is considered highly probable that the inner plasterboard layer will have been compromised in other areas (typically by occupants using mechanical fixings for securing items to the wall or by installation of electrical back boxes for light switches, sockets etc.). It is not considered feasible to destructively inspect the entire external walls of the building or practical to inspect each individual flat for evidence of any external wall and inner layer breaches. It is also not considered feasible to 'make good' any penetrations and as much as residents should be advised not to make openings into inner plasterboard layers, this could not be guaranteed or inspected to ensure this was not happening.

It is considered this further supports the installation of an AWFSS.

Previously there has been no specific reference within the Fire Safety Order (FSO) 2005 to external wall systems and fire doors; however, for clarity they are now specifically mentioned within the Fire Safety Order: Article 6 – 'Application to premises'.



Photo 34

## Internal Surface Linings

### 16.5. Do surface linings within the building contribute towards fire growth?

Escape routes at Rossett House are protected through effective compartmentation of REI 30 and the majority of surface lining materials are furnished to Euro Class B- s3, d2 or better to inhibit any lateral fire spread.

All linings of internal walls and floors within protected areas are solid and non combustible, and free of any additions which could be ignited and contribute to surface flame spread.

As a result, surface linings on walls and floors are not expected to contribute towards fire growth.

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Protected escape routes should be protected through effective compartmentation of REI 30 with all surface lining materials furnished to Euro Class B-s3, d2 or better to inhibit any lateral fire spread.

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**16.6. General comments / defects:**

None.

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## 17. Compartmentation & Fire Separation

The appropriate fire separation and compartmentation of parts of a building are designed to restrict the internal spread and inhibit the damage of fire. This usually takes place between floors/ceilings and rooms/areas of high risk, with the creation of 'designated' or 'protected' routes whereby occupants can make their escape relatively unhindered and unharmed.

### 17.1. The fire resistance of the structure is as follows:

As per current statutory guidance, the following fire resistance levels are expected for the building:

- 120 minutes: for structural load-bearing elements
- 120 minutes: All compartment walls other than between any flat or firefighting stair, lobby or shaft
- 60 minutes: Separation between residential flats and any other area
- 30 minutes for all protected escape routes within communal areas

### 17.2. Are there clear and obvious breaches / defects in fire resisting construction?

Protected escape routes and residential dwellings are generally well compartmented with little to no evidence of breaches/defects which could result in injury/ill health of relevant persons.

It is not reasonable to identify and advise on remediation for every breach / defect in compartmentation (fire stopping issues) that might exist within a building. Where defects are consistent and it is foreseeable that defects have the potential to affect the safety of those within the building, a specific compartmentation survey should be undertaken. The key principles of a compartmentation survey are to identify routes of heat and smoke transfer within the premises, e.g. service risers, ventilation risers, kitchen and bathroom extraction arrangements, flat entrance doors and breaches in fire resisting construction. The survey should determine whether past alterations / refurbishment on the building have had an impact on existing compartmentation.

### 17.3. Is a compartmentation survey required / been carried out on the premises?

As part of the T4 fire risk assessment project, Holistic Fire Safety have been commissioned to complete a compartmentation survey on each HRRB. Holistic Fire Safety have appraised the compartmentation of each building and subsequently identified all breaches and defects in fire resisting construction.

Holistic Fire Safety have utilised 'Bolster' which is a digital recording platform to identify breaches and their locations. Each survey will generate a PDF document which can be used to brief Senior Management on findings. HFS's passive fire protection installers who work under the BM Trada Q-Mark scheme have identified each individual penetration and plotted them onto the building layout plans. Each report has identified the surface, substrate and size of each penetration before providing examples of materials which could be used to remediate.

Holistic Fire Safety have provided HCC with methods of satisfying building regulations, and with the intention of complying with test details, supplied by 'Protecta' and other manufacturers.

Refer to:

HFS.HCC.RossettHouse.CSR.1.0 - Executive Summary & Bolster pin drops

### Summary of findings from compartmentation survey

### 17.4. Flats:

Upon inspection, the extractor fan in the sampled flat was observed to be lacking an intumescent sleeve. It was also noted, copper and plastic pipes and service cables/bundles were penetrating compartment boundaries along with the use of unidentified foam in the meter cupboard.

It is considered rather than carry out remediation work to rectify these issues, the installation of an AWFSS would prove sufficient in providing measures to mitigate these areas. The recommendation is covered in 24.2.



Photo 35



Photo 36



Photo 37



Photo 38



Photo 39



Photo 40



Photo 41

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### 17.5. Common Areas:

Breaches were present at the point data cables and conduit pass through fire resisting partitions. The majority of these appear to have been fire stopped although there was no test evidence to support this.

The timber loft hatch to the roof void requires replacing for a fire resisting equivalent which provides a minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance.

The ceiling and ceiling hatch in the bin chute room on the fourth floor requires upgrading to provide 60 minutes fire resistance. Refer to the compartmentation survey for evidence of breaches and methods of remediation.



Photo 42



Photo 43



Photo 44




Photo 45

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### 17.6. Ancillary Accommodation:

The standard of compartmentation within the external refuse chute, CCTV/Services room and store/cleaners room was generally satisfactory with limited evidence of breaches - minor works required.

HCC should refer to the compartmentation survey for evidence of breaches and methods of remediation.



Photo 46



Photo 47




Photo 48



Photo 49




Photo 50



Photo 51



Photo 52

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### 17.7. Service Risers:

There are x7 electric meter cupboards located externally on the ground floor. Service cables were noted to penetrate timber boarding. Accessed could not be gained to determine if services penetrate the floor above.

HCC should refer to the compartmentation survey for evidence of breaches and methods of remediation.




Photo 53



Photo 54

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### 17.8. Ventilation Risers:

There are circa x7 ventilation riser shafts in the roof void. These were observed to be open with no fire separation in place which require fire stopping at the top and bottom.

HCC should refer to the compartmentation survey for evidence of breaches and methods of remediation.




Photo 55




Photo 56

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### 17.9. Other:

Fire barriers are provided in the roof void to separate areas at appropriate intervals. These were noted to be compromised due to openings which have been made.

HCC should refer to the compartmentation survey for methods of remediation.




Photo 57




Photo 58




Photo 59

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## Conclusion

### 17.10. Are levels of compartmentation within the building adequate to separate adjoining flats, flats and the common areas and flats and other ancillary accommodation?

No O&M manuals have been supplied to HCC following previous fire stopping works.

HCC representatives confirmed that current fire stopping measures were carried out as a temporary control measure following initial concerns in a previous assessment; works were not carried out by a third party certified installer. It was confirmed that all future fire stopping works are to be completed by competent third party certified installers following findings of the compartmentation survey.

Providing passive fire protection works are undertaken within a timely manner, using tested solutions and completed by a third party certified installer, levels of compartmentation are considered satisfactory to support the evacuation strategy and its occupancy.

HCC must ensure that handover packs are received from contractors undertaking works to meet the requirements of Building Regulations 2010 - Regulation 38 - Fire Safety Information.

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## 18. Means of escape from flats

### 18.1. Description of flat layout:

Residential flats are single, two and three bed occupancies whereby all habitable rooms discharge onto the internal hallway.

### 18.2. Are travel distances within flats restricted to 9 meters? If distances exceed tolerances, are mitigation measures in place adequate to control the risk?

Flat 30, which is a single storey one bed roomed flat, was sampled with measurements providing a travel distance of <9m.

Means of escape within these flats is typical of diagram 3.3 of ADB B1 which does not require flats to have a protected internal hallway. This principle was based on limiting travel distances to circa 9m which in turn reduces the chance that residents could become trapped in the event of a fire. Additionally, cooking facilities are remote from the entrance door and do not prejudice the escape route from any point in the flat.

Flats accessed from the third floor corridor can be described as duplex/maisonnettes and alternate between flats that descend one storey down within the flat or ascend two storeys up.

Flat 20 was sampled with travel distances well in excess of 9m observed.

Automatic fire detection and warning is provided within the primary risk room (kitchen) and throughout escape routes including the lounge; in addition, the existing door to the kitchen is a notional FD20 doors which is expected to be adequate to provide sufficient time for evacuation however, the door to the lounge in flat 20 had been removed which does not allow for a protected route as described in BS 9991 (9.5.2).

Due to extended travel distances with flats and in accordance with guidance contained in BS 9991, consideration should be given to installing an AWFSS. The recommendation is covered in 24.2.




Photo 60




Photo 61




Photo 62

**18.2. Maisonnettes having a floor level higher than 4.5 m above ground or access level**  
Maisonnettes that have a floor level that is higher than 4.5 m above the ground level or the access level should have at least one of the following:  
a) an alternative exit from any habitable room that is not on the entrance level of the maisonnette (see Figure 2); or  
b) a protected escape route consisting of habitable rooms and one entrance and from each floor level other than the entrance level (see Figure 3); or  
c) a protected escape route and an L1 fire detection and fire alarm system in accordance with BS 5839-1:2013. For flats more than 15 m above or below the level of the entrance of the maisonnette; or  
d) a protected escape route and an AWFSS (see 11.2, Table 2).

### 18.3. Are flats provided with a protected entrance hall and restricted travel distance? Is the standard of doors and construction adequate to restrict fire growth and facilitate evacuation from the dwelling?

It cannot be guaranteed where excess travel distances exist, that doors have not been removed within flats which are required to protect the escape route. At the point of survey for the AWFSS, further inspection of doors should be carried out to determine if they are adequate to protect the stairway.

### 18.4. Are flats provided with an alternative exit?

Ground floor flats have alternative exits.

### 18.5. Are further mitigation measures required as a result of defects / non compliant provisions?

Covered in 18.2 and 18.3.



## 19. Means of escape from common parts

### 19.1. Are flats provided with a balcony approach or deck approach?

No.

### 19.2. Are flats provided with a corridor or lobby approach?

Yes. The third floor has an enclosed corridor.



Photo 63

### 19.3. Is every flat separated from the common escape stairway?

Flats to the 6 storey stairway to the north of the building discharge directly onto the stairway and are separated by self-closing, certified FD30s fire doorsets.

Flats on the third floor are separated from the common escape stairway by certified FD30s fire doors. Alternative means of escape are provided to both ends of the building from the third floor.

Ground floor flats 3 - 9, discharge directly into open air. Flats 1 & 2 on the ground floor have an alternative rear exit discharging directly into open air.

### 19.4. Are there reasonable distances of travel where there is escape in a single direction?

The distance of travel between the furthest flat entrance door and the door to the protected lobby on the third floor is 10m.

### 19.5. Are there reasonable distances of travel where there are alternative means of escape?

The third floor is provided with alternative exits, both of which are within reasonable travel distances and are separated by fire resisting construction.

### 19.6. Are there adequate smoke control provisions to protect the common escape routes?

The third floor corridor is provided with ventilation by openable windows.

There is no ventilation provided to the escape stairway to the south of the building accessed from the third floor.

Limited ventilation can be achieved on the fourth floor at low level by openable windows however, it was noted most of these were screwed shut or seized.

There is no ventilation provided to the fifth floor stairway to the north of the building.

Current guidance states that vents in lobbies or corridors adjoining stairways should be operated automatically, however the installation of Automatic Opening Vent (AOV's) are not considered reasonably practicable. Although current openings do not provide a minimum free area of 1.5 metres squared (m<sup>2</sup>) to the fourth floor, current provisions are considered adequate given other mitigation measures in place and that maintenance is carried out to release seized windows and remove screws.

Protected stairways also need means to ventilate any smoke that may enter the stairway during evacuation or fire fighting and allow a route for air to reach ventilated lobbies. A vent of at least 1m<sup>2</sup> needs to be provided at the head of the stairway for this. Current guidance states that in blocks of flats with a single stairway, it is recommended that the vent is operated automatically via an AOV.

It is not considered reasonably practicable to provide ventilation in the stairway to the north of the building however, consideration should be given to providing ventilation in the stairway to the south of the building which is accessed from the third floor.

This could be achieved by providing a Manual Opening Vent (MOV) alternatively, ventilation could be achieved by installing low level and high level louvered vents.




Photo 64




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


Photo 66




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


Photo 68



Photo 69

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### **19.7. Are door widths and escape routes sufficient for the volume of occupants who are required to use them?**

Door widths along escape routes are considered to be satisfactory for the evacuation strategy and occupancy.

Approx. widths which form part of the escape route are as follows;

- Stairs 780mm and 900mm
- Stair doors 940mm
- Cross corridor doors – 940mm
- Final exits between 730 - 1100mm

There is currently no recorded evidence of challenges faced by residents with regards door widths.

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### **19.8. Do doors along escape routes open in the direction of escape, where necessary?**

All doors open in the direction of travel where necessary.

---

### **19.9. Do escape routes have a minimum clear headroom of 2m and are escape route floor finishes designed to minimise their impact when wet?**

Floor coverings and head clearances are adequate to assist with evacuation.

---

### **19.10. Are all routes clearly identified through appropriate signage and lighting which lead residents to a place of ultimate safety?**

Provisions for signage and emergency lighting are considered to be inadequate to aid and assist relevant persons reach a place of ultimate safety. Refer to section 23 for details of Wayfinding signage.

---

### **19.11. Are there adequate provisions of exits which are easily and immediately openable?**

Final exits doors are manually operated via single action mechanisms and fail safe to open in the event of power failure. The south stairway final exit is operated by a push bar to open.

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### **19.12. Is the fire-resisting construction (including any glazing) protecting escape routes and staircases of a suitable standard and maintained in sound condition?**

The doors and curtain walling to the north stairway (ground 3rd and 4th floors) and the fixed partitions on the 1st, 2nd & 5th floor are metal with non fire glazing (EN 14179 glazing on staircase). It could not be confirmed if the panels are of fire-resisting material.

Cross corridor doors and the lift lobby on the third floor are separated by fire rated construction which is made up of notional self closing FD60s door assemblies and Georgian wired glazing. Partitions are made up of a part glazed system and wooden lower panels.

The window to flat 16 that opens into the third floor protected corridor is required to be a sealed unit of 30

minutes fire resistance.



Photo 70




Photo 71



Photo 72



Photo 73



Photo 74



Photo 75

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### 19.13. Is the design and maintenance of the means of escape considered adequate?

The general principles of means of escape applied at Rossett House are:

- Horizontal escape from the flat entrance door to a stairway or final exits; and - Vertical escape via a stairway leading to a final exit or place of relative safety
  - Corridors and escape routes are clear of significant fire hazards, meaning that the most likely place for a fire to start is within a flat;
  - Flats and risk rooms have a reasonable level of compartmentation; therefore, the probability of fire spread from the room of origin will be low; and
  - If a fire does occur in common areas, the materials and construction will restrict fire spread and development whilst additional measures are in place to raise the alarm and provide smoke control.
-

## 20. Fire Doors

### 20.1. Is the fire resistance of doors / curtain walling to staircases and the common areas considered adequate, and are the doors maintained in sound condition? Describe the standard and condition of door sets?

As detailed previously, flats to the 6 storey stairway to the north of the building discharge directly onto the stairway and are separated by certified self-closing, FD30s fire doorsets .

Doors and curtain walling to the north staircase are made up of metal frames and doors with none fire rated glazed apertures at upper levels and panelling to the lower parts. It could not be confirmed if the panels are of fire-resisting material.

It is recommended the doors and curtain walling to the north staircase are replaced to provide a minimum of 30 minutes fire resistance.

All doors which form part of escape routes to the third floor are self-closing, notional FD30s fire doorsets which are considered to be in reasonable condition considering their age and usage; however general maintenance and remediation is required.

It is expected that current installations are satisfactory and will prevent the passage of smoke and products of combustion which could compromise escape routes.

Doorsets are provided with:

- Reasonable condition notional leaf and frame
- Good condition polished Georgian wired integrity fire resistant glazing
- x3 100mm BS 1935 Grade 13 CE marked hinges
- Frames have a 25mm stop lat
- Appropriate single strip combination cold smoke and intumescent seals fitted into the leaf
- Gaps between leaf and frame are generally more than 3mm top and side rails, however there are variations to this and gaps at the bottom threshold are consistently >8mm
- A BSEN 1154 CE marked self closing device with a minimum power rating 3 (Grade 1) is fitted to all communal doors. A number of samples were taken on different floors with the majority capable of closing from any angle and not taking longer than 25 seconds to overcome the resistance of any seals to close into their frames.

Defects consisted of:

- Hinges leaking requiring replacement
- Strips and seals are overpainted and occasionally routed too deep
- Gaps above acceptable tolerances

Curtain walling and partitions which form escape route to the third floor are made up of timber frames which are completed by large Georgian wired glazed apertures at upper levels and wooden panels below.

As a result, it is advised that given minor defects, a specific fire door inspection is undertaken to specify what action is required.




Photo 76



Photo 77



Photo 78



Photo 79



Photo 80




Photo 81



Photo 82



Photo 83



Photo 84



Photo 85

**20.2. Is the fire resistance of doors to meter cupboards/store rooms/plant rooms in the common areas considered adequate, and are they adequately secured and/or fitted with suitable self-closing devices? Describe the standard and condition of door sets?**

Internal refuse chutes are separated by a mixture of metal and timber self-closing, notional FD30 fire doorsets which are considered to be in good condition. Metal doorsets have none fire rated glazed apertures at upper levels and panelling to the lower parts. It could not be confirmed if the panels are of fire-resisting material.

It is recommended the metal doors are replaced to provide a minimum of 30 minutes fire resistance.

Ancillary accommodation doors are notional 44mm FD30s doorsets and were generally satisfactory although hinges were observed to be overpainted or none fire rated, a lack of strips and seals, gaps in excess of acceptable tolerances and missing signage.

As a result, it is advised that given minor defects, a specific fire door inspection is undertaken to specify what action is required.



Photo 86




Photo 87



Photo 88



Photo 89



Photo 90




Photo 91




Photo 92



Photo 93




Photo 94



Photo 95

**20.3. Are suitable self-closing devices fitted to doors which discharge into common areas?**

All doors other than those locked shut which form part of, and discharge onto escape routes are provided with overhead, scissor self closing devices.




Photo 96

**20.4. Is the fire resistance of flat entrance doors considered adequate, and are doors maintained in sound condition? Describe the standard and condition of door sets?**

All flat entrance doors have been replaced with third party certified FD30s fire doorsets, which meet the requirements detailed in the ADBVol: 1 Appendix C1 2a for fire resistance and smoke control from both sides, and are fitted with an appropriate positive action self-closing device (BS 1154) and a single action mechanism which does not require the use of a key.

No evidence of certification has been provided, however handover packs are expected to be held by HCC compliance teams.

Door-sets have BM Trada Manufacturers plugs installed within the edge of the door leaf, however there is no evidence to suggest that doorsets have been installed by BM Trada certified installers.




Photo 97



Photo 98

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**20.5. Are suitable self-closing devices fitted to flat entrance doors and, where fitted, maintained in good working order?**

All flat entrance doors are fitted with an appropriate overhead BS 1154 self closing device.




Photo 99

## 21. Means of warning

### 21.1. Is a fire detection and fire alarm system provided within the common areas of the building? Where applicable, confirm the category of system and describe provisions.

Rossett House does not have a communal fire alarm system, nor is one considered necessary given its occupancy and preventative and protective measures in place.

### 21.2. Where applicable, is control indicating equipment provided and positioned in a suitable location?

N/A.

### 21.3. Where applicable, has a fire alarm zone plan been provided? This should consist of 'a diagrammatic representation of the building, showing building entrances, the main circulation areas and the division into zones. The diagrammatic representation should be printed, correctly orientated and provide an accurate zone plan.'

N/A.

### 21.4. Where applicable, are manual call points provided at suitable locations? Describe provisions.

N/A.

### 21.5. Where applicable, are sounders including visual alarm devices suitable for the occupancy and considered adequate in raising the alarm?

N/A.

### 21.6. Where applicable, is the system connected to an alarm receiving centre?

N/A.

### 21.7. Where applicable, are there adequate arrangements in place for silencing and resetting an alarm condition?

N/A.

### 21.8. Are provisions within communal areas adequate to meet the purpose group and occupancy of the building?

Yes.

## Detection and alarm systems within residential accommodation

### 21.9. Are provisions within residential accommodation adequate to meet the purpose group and occupancy of the property? Describe the standard/category along with provisions.

The sampled flats (flat 20 & 30) were provided with as a minimum, Grade D1 LD2 (BS 5839:2019 + A1:2020) systems which comprises of smoke detection throughout all circulation areas that form part of the escape route from [within] and heat detection within areas of high fire risk to occupants (kitchen).

Upon activation of a detector, the alarm will sound locally to the flat of origin and it will be the responsibility of occupants / neighbouring residents to notify Humberside Fire & Rescue to request their attendance. Actions to be taken are confirmed by Fire Action Notices and information contained within residents' handbooks.

Residents with specific impairments should be provided with individual devices in the form of pendants and vibrating pads. Again, such provisions should be considered as part of the PCFRA.

HCC confirmed that as part of future proofing of their HRRB's, as a baseline install within void properties, a Grade D1 LD2 fire alarm system is installed. HCC are also working on a system which sends key information to the cloud. E.g. the system will identify issues in the event of an activation - HCC will be automatically notified. HCC do not currently have sufficient resources to monitor activations however, plans are being put in place to achieve this.



Photo 100



Photo 101




Photo 102

## Evacuation alert system

Inline with recommendations made in Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower report (Executive Summary) Section 12, 33.22 (d). If the property is defined as a high rise residential building, it should be equipped with an evacuation and alert system which meets BS 8629:2019.

### **21.10. Is an Evacuation alert system provided and does it consist of the following:**

- **Evacuation and alert control indicating equipment (EACIE) within additional SIB accessible to the attending Fire and Rescue Service**
- **Signage to indicate EACIE**
- **Sounders for evacuation and alert system within each residential flat**
- **EACIE to be on toggle switches**
- **Ability for the Fire and Rescue service to control evacuation by individual floor or whole building**

Rossett House is not defined as a high rise residential building therefore, there is no requirement for an evacuation alert system.



## 22. Emergency escape lighting

### 22.1. Has a reasonable standard of emergency escape lighting been provided? Is emergency escape lighting adequate to enable occupants to locate, and move safely along defined routes and escape via final exits? Describe arrangements and deficiencies observed.

Although emergency lighting was not tested, an inspection of luminaires and their locations has determined that provisions are adequate to enable occupants to locate, and move safely along, defined routes and escape via final exits.

Emergency lighting installed consists of wall and ceiling mounted luminaires which are located directly outside flats, lobbies and the stairwell; all luminaires are low voltage LED.

The building is provided with a mixture of maintained (X 1 180) luminaires and non maintained (X 0 180) luminaires with a three hour battery back up. Final exits are maintained units. Internal and external provisions appear satisfactory, although there are some small rooms which are not provided with luminaires, however based on risk assessment, the risk within these areas has determined current provisions as satisfactory.

Luminaires are provided with test switch keys which are located at various places and are tested monthly internally.

Provisions appear to be in accordance with BS 9999 Table 8




Photo 103



Photo 104

## 23. Fire safety signs and notices

### 23.1. Is there a reasonable standard of fire safety signs and notices?

Fire safety signage is generally to a satisfactory standard both internally and external to the premises with reasonable provisions for hazard warning signs (risk rooms), mandatory signage for fire doors, information signage detailing emergency arrangements and prohibition signage for smoking. Fire safety signage is generally in accordance with the Health and Safety (Signs and Signals) Regulations together with BS 5499-4: 2013 and BS EN 7010.

### 23.2. Are Fire Action Notices provided and displayed in appropriate locations?

The ground floor is provided with comprehensive instruction on actions to be taken in the event of fire. No other fire action notices were observed in the building.



Photo 105

### 23.3. Is emergency evacuation/safe condition signage provided within communal areas?

The expectation is that all residents are familiar with the layout of the building, however there is a lack of emergency escape signage throughout the building.

It is advised that escape route signage is addressed and improved and consists of the following:

- A combination of a BS EN ISO 7010 emergency exit sign including a directional arrow and supplementary text
- The use of supplementary text should be in accordance with BS 5499-4 clause 4.7 and state either 'Exit' or 'Fire Exit'
- For any sign suggesting a 'straight ahead' an up arrow is required (meaning 'progress forward and through here' as per BS 5499-4:2013 Table 1). A down arrow suggests a change in level downwards.

It is advised that all replacement safe condition escape route signage should be photo luminescent as manufactured by Jailite. Signs should be rigid or semi rigid PVC fixed by 4 x screws in each corner of the sign or with appropriate adhesive.

An escape route signing system should ensure that from any place within a building, where direct sight of an exit is not possible and doubt might exist as to its position, a directional sign (or series of signs) is provided. Signs should be placed so that a person moving within the means of escape is progressed towards a final exit and all signing systems should be clear so that they minimise the risk of confusion for the public.



Photo 106




Photo 107

### 23.4. Is suitable and adequate signage in place to notify relevant persons of actions taken in relation to lifts?

Information relating to the use of lifts in the event of fire is contained within fire action notices.

### 23.5. Is 'Fire exit, keep clear' signage in place at appropriate locations?

To prevent persons from obstructing emergency exit doors on the external side of the building, 'Fire exit

keep clear' signs that comply to BS 5499-4 have been displayed on the outside of final doors.




Photo 108

### 23.6. Is hazard warning signage provided at appropriate locations?

Hazard warning signage is in place on the external face of risk areas such as the lift motor room and the external electrical substation. Each individual ESU within the building is also provided with hazard warning signage to warn both occupants and responding fire crews.



Photo 109

### 23.7. Is mandatory signage prescribing a specific behaviour in place at appropriate locations?

Mandatory signage prescribing a specific behaviour is displayed prominently on all fire doors where necessary throughout the building although minor deficiencies were observed.

- Fire doors which are accessible from either side have 'Fire door keep shut' signs attached to both sides of the door leaf however, the door to the under stair electric meter cupboard in the north stairway and the CCTV/Services door are missing appropriate signage
- Fire doors where access is restricted, has 'Fire door keep locked' sign to the open facing leaf of the door only although the storage doors on the third floor did not and are required



Photo 110



Photo 111



Photo 112



Photo 113



Photo 114

### 23.8. In relation to Regulation 8 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022, has the responsible person ensured that the building contains clear markings of floor identification and identification of domestic premises in the form of Wayfinding Signage?

Rossett House is provided with basic signage which does identify both floor number and flat numbers; there is also printed signage within the stairwell which identifies floor numbers.

Although emergency lighting is provided, current signage is not considered adequate to be visible in lowlighting or smoky conditions.

It is a requirement that floor numbers be clearly marked on each landing within the stairways and in a prominent place in all lobbies in such a way as to be visible both in normal conditions and in lowlighting or smoky conditions.

ADB Vol 1. 15.14 states that floor identification signs should meet all of the following conditions:

- A. The signs should be located on every landing of a protected stairway and every protected corridor/lobby (or open access balcony) into which a firefighting lift opens.
- B. The text should be in sans serif typeface with a letter height of at least 50mm. The height of the numeral that designates the floor number should be at least 75mm.

- C. The signs should be visible from the top step of a firefighting stair and, where possible, from inside a firefighting lift when the lift car doors open.
- D. The signs should be mounted between 1.7m and 2m above floor level and, as far as practicable, all the signs should be mounted at the same height.
- E. The text should be on a contrasting background, easily legible and readable in low level lighting conditions or when illuminated with a torch.

ADB Vol 1. 15.15 states the floor number designations should meet all of the following conditions:

- F. The floor closest to the ground level should be designated as either Floor 0 or Ground Floor.
- G. Each floor above the ground floor should be numbered sequentially beginning with Floor 1.
- H. A lower ground floor should be designated as either Floor -1 or Lower Ground Floor.
- I. Each floor below the ground floor should be numbered sequentially beginning with Floor -1 or Basement 1.

ADB Vol 1. 15.16 states the flat indicator signs should meet all of the following conditions:

- J. The signs should be sited immediately below the floor identification signs, such that the top edge of the sign is no more than 50mm below the bottom edge of the floor identification sign.
- K. The wording should take the form Flats X-Y, with the lowest flat number first.
- L. The text should be in sans serif typeface with a letter height of at least half that of the floor indicator sign.
- M. The wording should be supplemented by arrows when flats are in more than one direction.
- N. The text and arrows should be on a contrasting background, easily legible and readable in low level lighting conditions or when illuminated with a torch.




Photo 115



Photo 116

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For the purposes of the paragraph above “markings” means an identification designed and located in accordance with the guidance in Volume 1 of Approved Document B(1) on each landing within the stairways and in the lift lobbies of the floor level marked in such a way as to be visible both in low level lighting conditions or when illuminated with a torch.

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## 24. Extinguishing media and fixed systems

### 24.1. Is Automatic Water Fire Suppression Systems (AWFSS) provided within communal areas/ancillary accommodation? Where applicable, describe arrangements and deficiencies.

None provided.

### 24.2. Is Automatic Water Fire Suppression Systems (AWFSS) provided within residential accommodation? Where applicable, describe arrangements and deficiencies.

Due to the presence of polystyrene insulation used in the external cladding system which has been established is neither non-combustible or of limited combustibility, compartmentation breaches within flats as detailed in 17.4 and extended travel distances within flats as detailed in 18.2, the installation of an engineered solution retro-fitted AWFSS sprinkler system is recommended to provide mitigation measures in these areas.

The recent amendment to ADB Vol 1. (May 2020) with regard to the lowering of the trigger height for sprinkler requirements in relevant buildings to 11 metres only emphasises this is a proactive approach to the direct safety of the sleeping residents.

### 24.3. Is suitable portable firefighting equipment provided at appropriate locations? Where applicable, describe arrangements and deficiencies.

Extinguishers are not present within means of escape.

A dry powder fire extinguisher is provided in the CCTV/Service room. The use of dry powder extinguishers within small and under ventilated compartments should be avoided - this principle should be applied across HCC's housing stock.

The use of dry powder extinguishers indoors can lead to:

- impaired visibility
- issues with inhalation
- damage to plant and property.

Dry powder extinguishers should be removed from the premises and replaced with an appropriate equivalent. E.g. CO2.

The CO2 extinguishers in the gas boiler room was not in date (01/2018).

HCC should also consider reviewing fire extinguisher provisions within the building with a view of converting extinguishers to composite P50 extinguishers; benefits include environmental and financial savings.




Photo 117



Photo 118

## 25. Other relevant fixed systems and equipment

### 25.1. Where applicable, are there appropriately sited facilities for electrical isolation of any photovoltaic (PV) cells, with appropriate signage, to assist the fire and rescue service?

There is no PV system installed at Rossett House.

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### 25.2. Other fixed systems including arrangements and deficiencies.

Fire dampers are provided in ductwork at the point extraction exits bathrooms in residential dwellings and enters central shafts. Bathrooms sampled (Flat 30) gave evidence of x1 vents (high level) which have dampers installed which are activated via fusible link.

It was confirmed that accessible dampers which are located in service risers are subjected to inspection and testing every four years. As dampers are activated via fusible link, there are no moving parts and therefore no requirement for inspection.

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## 26. Access and facilities for the fire service

### 26.1. Are the following provisions provided for the premises:

- External access which enables fire appliances to be used near the building
- Access into the building for firefighters to search and rescue people
- Access into the building for firefighters to fight any fires

Access roads are generally free from obstruction and depending on route taken are not compromised by parked vehicles even though surrounding areas are heavily populated by residential accommodation.

HFRS are provided with key fob access and crews regularly carry out familiarisation visits.

In line with Regulation 4 & 6 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022, Holistic Fire Safety have provided HCC with information to include within the secure information box e.g. accurate building and floor plans to assist HFRS search and rescue people and fight fires.

### 26.2. Are provisions for fire appliance approach and positioning satisfactory to facilitate and assist emergency response? Describe arrangements and deficiencies - widths, heights, weight tolerances, distance from riser/building etc.

Access to Rossett House is via Quantock Close via Walker Street and leads directly to the front of the building.

Current provisions provide a minimum of 3.7m in width and 4m in height to allow for unrestricted access for pumping and high reach appliances (ADB Vol 1. B5 Table 13.1).

There are no obvious signs of weight restrictions or anything that could impact appliance approach and positioning. The nearest point at which a fire appliance could position to the building is <18 meters; however as described above the location of appliance positioning will be dynamic and confirmed by the Officer In Charge.




Photo 119




Photo 120




Photo 121

### 26.3. Water main: Describe arrangements and deficiencies observed.

All immediate hydrants are within 90 metres, and are 100mm diameter and are the responsibility of the local water authority undertaking, via Humberside Fire and Rescue Service, who maintain each hydrant on a two year flow test programme.



Photo 122



Photo 123

### 26.4. Dry riser: Describe arrangements and deficiencies observed.

Rossett House is provided with a dry riser. Landing valves are located in the north stairway.

The inlet valve is not surface mounted on the exterior of the building and is located in the ground floor stairway meaning access is initially via the main entrance door, along the lobby and through the door to the stairway.

There is no signage to notify responding fire crews of the location of the inlet valve.

The dry riser serves all floors and it is estimated that all points within each flat of the block are in the region of 45m from the nearest landing valve.



Photo 124



Photo 125




Photo 126




Photo 127




Photo 128

## 26.5. Other / defects:

Lifts at Rossett House are not designated firefighting lifts, however there is an agreement in place that lifts would be utilised by HFRS in the event of an incident.

Signage within communal areas clearly states that lifts are not to be used in the event of an incident by relevant persons.

### Secure information box

In relation to Regulation 4 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022, the responsible person in relation to a high-rise residential building must install and maintain a secure information box in or on the building

## 26.6. Is the secure information box positioned at a location in or on the building which is readily accessible to the fire and rescue authority?

The SIB is located in the main entrance within the ground floor lobby. It has been agreed by all relevant parties that its location is the most suitable - internally.



Photo 129

## 26.7. Is the secure information box capable of containing documents required by these Regulations and is it reasonably secure from unauthorised access and vandalism?

HCC are currently reviewing the content of the SIB.

Content is to include the following:

- 3 laminated plans of each floor including flat numbers + arrangements to meet Regulation 6
- Details of vulnerable residents - PEEPS (Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans)
- Evacuation plan for the block
- Details of "essential fire-fighting equipment"
- Location of utility `shut off` valves
- Location of service risers
- Location of fire fighting lifts (where applicable)
- Location of EACIE (if/when installed)
- Copies of building access keys
- Copies of lift engagement key
- Copy of SSRI & Ops Pre plan
- Copy of appliance pump pressure convertor
- Location of utility `shut off` valves

The responsible person must ensure that the following information is contained within the



secure information box (Assessor to confirm)

**26.8. Is the name, address and telephone number within the United Kingdom of the responsible person present?**

Under review.

**26.9. Is the name and contact information of such other persons within the United Kingdom who are provided with the facilities to and are permitted to access the building as the responsible person considers appropriate present?**

Under review.

**26.10. Has the responsible person provided the local fire and rescue authority with everything required to enable it to access the secure information box and are arrangements in place to as soon as reasonably practicable notify the local fire and rescue authority if there are any changes to those requirements?**

Holistic Fire Safety are to complete an audit/assessment of the management of HRRBs - this audit/assessment will confirm HCC are meeting all the requirements of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022.

It can be confirmed that arrangements are in place to notify the local fire and rescue authority if there are any changes which affect their ability to gain access to the building, carry out search and rescue or carry out firefighting operations.

<https://humbersidfire.gov.uk/your-safety/business-safety/fser>



Photo 130

Floor plan and building plans

**26.11. Are plans provided adequate to assist emergency response and meet the requirements of Regulation 6 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022?**

HCC have produced plans to meet Regulation 6 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022. Refer to 2.1

Confirmation of Regulation 11 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022

**26.12. Has the responsible person provided the local fire and rescue authority adequate documentation relating to Regulation 5 (design and materials in external walls)? This information must be communicated via electronic means.**

On 21/08/2017 an initial External Facade and Cladding report was completed by Fire Guidance UK LLP.

This has been provided to the local fire and rescue service.

**26.13. Has the responsible person provided the local fire and rescue authority adequate documentation relating to Regulation 6 (floor plans and building plan)? This information must be communicated via electronic means.**

HCC to confirm.

Refer to 2.1

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## 27. Resident and stakeholder engagement - communication & information

Regulation 9 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022, the responsible person must display fire safety instructions in a conspicuous part of any building:

- which contains two or more sets of domestic premises; and
- which contains common parts through which residents would need to evacuate in the case of an emergency.

Fire safety instructions must be in a comprehensible form that the residents can be reasonably expected to understand; they must also contain instructions relating to the evacuation strategy for the building, how to report a fire to the fire and rescue authority, and any other instruction that tells residents what they must do when a fire has occurred.

The responsible person must provide a copy of the instructions to a new resident of domestic premises within the building, as soon as reasonably practicable after that resident moves into the premises; and to all residents of domestic premises within the building within each period of 12 months beginning with the date these Regulations come into force.

After any material changes to the instructions, the responsible person must display the fire safety instructions and provide a copy to residents which relate to evacuation, how to report an incident and any other instruction of actions to be taken in the event of an incident.

Yes

### 27.1. Are arrangements in place to meet the requirements of Regulation 9?

HCC confirmed that significant efforts are being made to improve engagement and communication with residents; a clear and defined example of this is the creation of the Tenancy Management High Rise Team. In addition, HCC have created various steering and residents' groups which undertake monthly surgeries who are to be attended by emergency services - police, fire, antisocial groups etc.

HCC are currently in the process of producing a 'Welcome Pack / Resident Information Pack'; these safety packs are to cover the contents stated below along with resident duties, HCC obligations, key contacts within HCC and how to report defects / incidents etc.

HCC have committed to community drop-ins to assist engagement along with producing periodic briefing letters which provide updates - good and bad & feedback forms.

Consulting and notifying residents is critical to the safety of the building. The points below should be cross-referenced with information provided to residents to ensure adequate communication is in place. BS 9991:2015 Annex F Figure F.1 provides a suitable example of such advice, or residents may be provided with specific information in the form of a bespoke document. The term 'They' refers to Residents.

- How they can prevent fires in their own home and in the common parts.
- The importance of maintaining the security of their block (making sure doors close behind them when they enter or leave) and being vigilant for deliberate fire setting.
- that they should never store or use petrol, bottled gas, paraffin heaters or other flammable

materials in their flats.

- what action they should take if they discover a fire.
- how they can ensure they can make their way safely from their flats and how to exit the building once they have left their flat.
- what 'stay put' means if there is a fire elsewhere in the building.
- what they must do to safeguard communal escape routes, especially taking care to make sure fire doors self-close properly and are not wedged, tied or otherwise held open.
- what the policy on the use of common parts requires of them.
- how they can avoid inadvertently damaging the buildings fire protection when making changes to their flat. what is involved in testing their smoke alarms and how often they should do it.
- ways they can assist the fire and rescue service by not blocking access when parking, and by keeping fire main inlets and outlets, where provided, clear.
- how they can report essential repairs needed to fire safety measures in their flat and elsewhere in the block.

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### **27.2. Are arrangements in place to provide residents with sufficient information to meet guidance provided in BS 9991:2015 Annex F Figure F.1?**

As described above.

#### Fire doors

Regulation 10 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022, the responsible person, in relation to a building which contains two or more sets of domestic premises and which contains common parts through which residents would need to evacuate in the case of an emergency, must provide the required information about fire doors to the residents of the building.

Required information includes:

- Fire doors should be kept shut when not in use;
- Residents or their guests should not tamper with the self closing devices; and
- residents should report any faults or damages with doors immediately to the responsible person;

The required information must be provided by the responsible person to a new resident of domestic premises in the building, as soon as reasonably practicable after that resident moves into the premises; and to all residents of domestic premises within the building, within each period of 12 months beginning with the date these Regulations come into force.

The responsible person, in relation to a building which contains two or more sets of domestic premises and which is above 11 metres in height, must use best endeavours to undertake checks of fire doors at the entrances of individual domestic premises in the building at least every 12 months.

The responsible person in relation to a building which contains two or more sets of domestic premises and which is above 11 metres in height, must undertake checks of any fire doors in communal areas of the building at least every 3 months.

The responsible person must keep a record of the steps taken to comply with the obligation including in any case where access to the domestic premises was not granted during any 12 month period, and the steps taken by the responsible person to try and gain access. The checks required must include ensuring that the self-closing devices for the doors are working.

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### **27.3. Are arrangements in place to meet the requirements of Regulation 10?**

HCC are currently reviewing a number of internal arrangements and processes in attempt to meet the

requirements of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022. As described previously Holistic Fire Safety are to complete an audit/assessment of the management of HRRBs - this audit/assessment will confirm HCC are meeting all the requirements of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022.

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## 28. Management of fire safety

### 28.1. Fire safety at the premises is managed by:

Fire Safety in HCC's HRRB's is managed by Hull City Council with the Assistant Director seen as the most appropriate and senior role responsible for Fire Safety.

**28.2. To meet Article 18 of the Fire Safety Order - Safety assistance and inline with recommendations made by WG8 and Hackitt report (Building A Safer Future) Recommendation 3.1c), have those in control of the building nominated a 'Building Safety Manager' (BSM). This role should be nominated as the 'named individual' who is the single point of contact responsible for all safety issues in the premises. The BSM must have the 'relevant skills, knowledge, experience and behaviours, to carry out the day to day management of the fire and structural safety of the building, having regard to the statutory functions of the BSM'.**

HCC have not yet nominated an individual/role as the Building Safety Manager (BSM); a comprehensive recruitment drive has taken place, however they have been unable to fill the position.

**28.3. Safety assistance continued: Are competent person(s) appointed under Article 18 of the Fire Safety Order to assist the responsible person in undertaking the preventive and protective measures (i.e. relevant general fire precautions)?**

The structure of the organisation at HCC is complex and it is currently unclear from a third party's point of view who is responsible for each area associated with Fire Safety. As with any Local Authority, different departments are responsible for different areas of the organisation, it is the opinion of Holistic Fire Safety that HCC should document the organisational structure and roles responsible for fire safety.

See the attached as guidance:

There should be a formal agreement between duty holders and key roles such as Assistant Director, Head of Service, Families & Neighbourhoods etc. Their roles and responsibilities should be documented in the form of a matrix. The matrix should clearly identify the agreed responsibility for every key aspect of fire safety management specific to HCC.

(Duty holders include anyone who, "under a tenancy or contract, has a responsibility for maintenance or repair of the premises, maintenance or repair of anything in or on the premises, or for the safety of the premises". This can include a wide variety of people, including, third party contractors on short and long term agreements, along with fire risk assessors and service engineers who maintain fire protection equipment; roles who may commit offences if they do not carry out their work properly.)



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**28.4. Do those in control of the building have a Fire Safety Management Plan in place which demonstrates how fire safety is managed across the organisation. The management plan should be a single and central document which provides evidence of compliance with Article 11 of the Fire Safety Order - Fire safety arrangements.**

Verbal discussions with HCC representatives confirmed that HCC have a number of policies and procedures in place which confirmed compliance with Article 11 of the Fire Safety Order.

TCW is the electronic recording database which is defined as the buildings fire safety manual.

As described previously Holistic Fire Safety are to complete an audit/assessment of the management of HRRBs - this audit/assessment will confirm whether current provisions are satisfactory.

#### **28.5. Does the premises have a fire safety design strategy document?**

- **A complete and thorough consideration of the fire safety requirements and its occupants**
- **To widen the consideration of fire precautions with respect to broader objectives including life safety, business continuity and property protection**
- **To assist in the review of fire system design criteria prior to the preparation of the designs**
- **To ensure that fire protection system designs support the strategy**
- **To provide a framework for all future fire safety and protection works**

There is no fire strategy design document in place for Rossett House.

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#### **28.6. Does the property have a database/fire safety manual which contains the following information?**

- **Building design information**
- **Building plans - inc. locations of isolation points, fire hazards & hydrants**
- **Drawings of the building identifying the fire alarm zones and compartment boundaries**
- **Drawings defining levels of fire-resistance in accordance with the fire strategy**
- **Fire Risk Management Plan**
- **Fire risk assessment**
- **Routine test inspection and maintenance of passive and active systems**
- **Details of fire safety training**
- **Record and action plan of any fire safety audit and programme of works to remedy defects and deficiencies**
- **Evacuation procedures**
- **Business continuity plans**
- **Emergency Plan**
- **Safe working procedures**

TCW is the electronic recording database which is defined as the buildings fire safety manual.

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#### **28.7. Are those who occupy the premises as a 'place of work' provided with fire safety training specific to the building? In relation to Article 11 of the Fire Safety, fire safety training should cover:**

- **The premises fire safety strategy and procedures and their personal responsibilities to prevent and protect against outbreaks of fire**
- **What action to take if they discover a fire**
- **How to raise the alarm, the location of manual call points, and the procedure for contacting the Fire Service**
- **What action to take immediately on hearing the fire alarm**
- **The location and safe use of portable or other fire extinguishing equipment (if authorised to do so)**
- **The location of escape routes from their place of work including those routes not used regularly for normal access and egress**
- **Their responsibility to direct or escort visitors and contractors in their charge to escape routes (and in the case of disabled persons to the nearest useable escape route)**
- **The importance of keeping closed all fire doors and windows to limit the spread of fire, heat or smoke**
- **How to safely isolate or shutdown process plant or equipment, where appropriate**
- **The importance of good housekeeping in preventing the outbreak of fire and limiting its effects.**

It has been confirmed that HCC representatives are provided with fire safety training upon induction and at periodic intervals.

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Regulation 7 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022, relates to routine test, inspection and maintenance of lifts and essential firefighting equipment. It is important to demonstrate to the

legislative enforcing authority and Building Safety Regulator that the building has a comprehensive testing and recording programme of passive and active protection relating to the overall functioning of the building; such demonstration of planned preventative maintenance provides for a good fire safety culture and reduce the possibility of ignition.

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### **28.8. Are arrangements in place to inspect, test, and maintain lifts and essential fire fighting equipment within the premises?**

TCW is the electronic recording database which is defined as the buildings fire safety manual and this is where all records associated with all HCC's HRRB's are stored.

Verbal discussions confirmed that compliance plans & maintenance programmes are in place which detail test, inspection and maintenance frequencies for lifts and all essential fire fighting equipment.

Management audits should view records and ensure compliance with the appropriate British Standards.

It can be confirmed that arrangements are in place to notify the local fire and rescue authority if there are any changes which affect their ability to gain access to the building, carry out search and rescue or carry out firefighting operations.

<https://humbersidefire.gov.uk/your-safety/business-safety/fser> Regulation 7 of the Fire Safety Regulations 2022, relates to routine test, inspection and maintenance of lifts and essential firefighting equipment. It is important to demonstrate to the legislative enforcing authority and Building Safety Regulator that the building has a comprehensive testing and recording programme of passive and active protection relating to the overall functioning of the building; such demonstration of planned preventative maintenance provides for a good fire safety culture and reduce the possibility of ignition.

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Where the responsible person identifies any fault with a lift for use by firefighters, evacuation lift or piece of essential fire-fighting equipment, are arrangements in place for the responsible person to rectify the fault?

Where a fault identified cannot be rectified within a 24-hour period beginning with the time the fault is identified, the responsible person must, as soon as reasonably practicable report the fault to the local fire and rescue authority by electronic means; and subsequently report the rectification of the fault to the local fire and rescue authority by electronic means when it has been rectified

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